transactions from a future software market
04 July 2017
More on the third connection in Benkler’s Tripod, which was pretty general. This is just some notes on more concrete examples of how new kinds of direct connections between markets and peer production might work in the future.
Smart contracts should make it possible to enable these in a trustworthy, mostly decentralized, way.
Feature request I want emoji support on my blog, so I file, or find, a wishlist bug on the open source blog package I use: "Add emoji support." I then offer to enter into a smart contract that will be worthless to me if the bug is fixed on September 1, or give me my money back if the bug is unfixed at that date.
A developer realizes that fixing the bug would be easy, and wants to do it, so takes the other side of the contract. The developer's side will expire worthless if the bug is unfixed, and pay out if the bug is fixed.
"Unfixed" results will probably include bugs that are open, wontfix, invalid, or closed as duplicate of a bug that is still open.
"Fixed" results will include bugs closed as fixed, or any bug closed as a duplicate of a bug that is closed as fixed.
If the developer fixes the bug, and its status changes to fixed, then I lose money on the smart contract but get the feature I want. If the bug status is still unfixed, then I get my money back.
So far this is just one user paying one developer to write a feature. Not especially exciting. There is some interesting market design work to be done here, though. How can the developer signal serious interest in working on the bug, and get enough upside to be meaningful, without taking too much risk in the event the fix is not accepted on time?
Arbitrage I post the same offer, but another user realizes that the blog project can only support emoji if the template package that it depends on supports them. That user becomes an arbitrageur: takes the "fixed" side of my offer, and the "unfixed" side of the "Add emoji support" bug in the template project.
As an end user, I don't have to know the dependency relationship, and the market gives the arbitrageur an incentive to collect information about multiple dependent bugs into the best place to fix them.
Front-running Dudley Do-Right's open source project has a bug in it, users are offering to buy the "unfixed" side of the contract in order to incentivize a fix, and a trader realizes that Dudley would be unlikely to let the bug go unfixed. The trader takes the "fixed" side of the contract before Dudley wakes up. The deal means that the market gets information on the likelihood of the bug being fixed, but the developer doing the work does not profit from it.
This is a "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller" trading strategy. The front-runner is accepting the risk of Dudley burning out, writing a long Medium piece on how open source is full of FAIL, and never fixing a bug again.
Front-running game theory could be interesting. If developers get sufficiently annoyed by front-running, they could delay fixing certain bugs until after the end of the relevant contracts. A credible threat to do this might make front-runners get out of their positions at a loss.
CVE prediction A user of a static analysis tool finds a suspicious pattern in a section of a codebase, but cannot identify a specific vulnerability. The user offers to take one side of a smart contract that will pay off if a vulnerability matching a certain pattern is found. A software maintainer or key user can take the other side of these contracts, to encourage researchers to disclose information and focus attention on specific areas of the codebase.
Security information leakage Ernie and Bert discover a software vulnerability. Bert sells it to foreign spies. Ernie wants to get a piece of the action, too, but doesn't want Bert to know, so he trades on a relevant CVE prediction. Neither Bert nor the foreign spies know who is making the prediction, but the market movement gives white-hat researchers a clue on where the vulnerability can be found.
Open source metrics: Prices and volumes on bug futures could turn out to be a more credible signal of interest in a project than raw activity numbers. It may be worth using a bot to trade on a project you depend on, just to watch the market move. Likewise, new open source metrics could provide useful trading strategies. If sentiment analysis shows that a project is melting down, offer to take the "unfixed" side of the project's long-running bugs? (Of course, this is the same market action that incentivizes fixes, so betting that a project will fail is the same thing as paying them not to. My brain hurts.)
What's an "oracle"?
The "oracle" is the software component that moves information from the bug tracker to the smart contracts system. Every smart contract has to be tied to a given oracle that both sides trust to resolve it fairly.
For CVE prediction, the oracle is responsible for pattern matching on new CVEs, and feeding the info into the smart contract system. As with all of these, CVE prediction contracts are tied to a specific oracle.
Bots might have several roles.
Move investments out of duplicate bugs. (Take a "fixed" position in the original and an "unfixed" position in the duplicate, or vice versa.)
Make small investments in bugs that appear valid based on project history and interactions by trusted users.
Track activity across projects and social sites to identify qualified bug fixers who are unlikely to fix a bug within the time frame of a contract, and take "unfixed" positions on bugs relevant to them.
For companies: when a bug is mentioned in an internal customer support ticketing system, buy "unfixed" on that bug. Map confidential customer needs to possible fixers.